INTRODUCTION
Throughout the seemingly endless 2016 presidential campaign, the media breathlessly-if intermittently-debated the role of young voters. In the Democratic primaries and caucuses, fervent support from "millennials" 1 sustained septuagenarian Senator Bernie Sanders's candidacy far beyond anyone's expectations. 2 Heading into the general election, pundits argued heatedly whether Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton could count on this same youthful support, which had been an † decline, 11 and a whopping eight percent of voters eighteen to twenty-nine voted for a third-party candidate in 2016, a notably higher percentage than in 2012. 12 Recently, however, the relative predictability of youth voting has intersected with another political flash point: the voting process itself. Since 2010, twenty states-most of them with Republican-controlled legislatures-have established new limitations on voting. 13 Most commonly, these include requirements that voters show photo ID, but new laws also restrict voter registration drives, curtail early voting, and limit the distribution and collection of absentee ballots. lifted a significant barrier to such legislation in a number of states, and heading into the 2016 election fourteen states had new restrictive voting laws in place. 16 Voting rights organizations, minority groups, and Democrats have vigorously challenged such provisions in court, generally arguing that they are a deliberate attempt to suppress voting by minorities, the poor, and young Americans, all of whom tend to vote Democratic. 17 States have defended their legislation as minimally burdensome and necessary to deter voter fraud. This Article focuses on one specific thread in litigation over voting rights: challenges based on the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment was ratified in 1971 and lowered the minimum voting age in state and federal elections from twenty-one to eighteen. 23 Over the last few years, a growing number of plaintiffs have argued that state voting restrictions had the purpose and effect of suppressing young voters and therefore violate the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. 24 These are novel arguments, however, and courts have struggled with how to interpret the voting age Amendment. 25 I argue that the Twenty-Sixth Amendment should be read to prohibit legislation that has the purpose, at least in part, of suppressing voters because of their age.
26
Just as the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits intentional voter discrimination on the basis of race, so too does the Twenty-Sixth Amendment forbid intentional voter discrimination on the basis of age. The appropriate test for evaluating claims of intentional discrimination against young voters-or, for that matter, any group of voters claiming age discrimination-is the framework that the Supreme Court established for evaluating claims of intentional racial discrimination long and surprisingly complicated history of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, and I challenge claims about original intent that both sides in these various cases have made. In Part III, I argue that an intratextualist approach to the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, in which the parallel language of the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendment are read in parallel, makes the most sense. Furthermore, I suggest that demographic changes among the U.S. population are blurring the difference between voter discrimination on the basis of age and that based on race. Finally, I conclude with a few remarks about the Amendment's future in a hyperpartisan era.
I. THE EMERGING CONSENSUS
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment declares that "the right of citizens . . . who are eighteen years of age or older shall not be abridged . . . on account of age."
29
It was the most quickly ratified constitutional Amendment in American history, breaking the record that had previously been set by the Twelfth Amendment.
30
As discussed at length below, the Amendment itself had been nearly thirty years in the making, with origins in the debates over the World War II draft.
31
As most of the judges hearing contemporary Twenty-Sixth Amendment claims have noted, until recently the Amendment was rarely invoked in litigation.
32
In the immediate wake of ratification, a number of courts heard cases in which college students challenged voter registration requirements as violating the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. However, no dominant interpretation emerged from this case law, and the Supreme Court has never directly considered a case involving the voting age Amendment.
34
The interpretation of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, then, is up for grabs. There are three main possibilities: States defending restrictive voter laws have argued that the Amendment merely forbids states from setting their minimum voting ages any higher than eighteen.
35
A considerably broader, and, as I show, increasingly popular reading is that as an analogue to the Fifteenth Amendment, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment prohibits intentional discrimination against voters on the basis of age. 36 Finally, commentators have occasionally suggested that the amendment could be interpreted as a general prohibition against agebased discrimination.
37
As the remainder of this section demonstrates, the federal courts hearing these cases are moving toward a consensus on the middle ground of interpretation. To varying degrees, they have been cautiously willing to entertain the theory that the Twenty-Sixth Amendment bans legislation intended to suppress turnout among young voters. However, they have been reluctant to find evidence of such discriminatory purposes, and none of these courts have yet actually overturned a challenged provision on Twenty-Sixth Amendment grounds. 
A. North Carolina

40
A few months later, five young North Carolina voters, all twenty years old, filed a complaint in intervention alleging that the state law also violated the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. 41 The plaintiffs pointed specifically to the parts of the bill that eliminated same-day registration, removed pre-registration for sixteen-and seventeen-year-olds, and excluded student ID cards as voter identification.
42
These provisions, they argued, had the "purpose and effect" of suppressing young voters and were therefore unconstitutional.
43
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment, they suggested, prohibits "laws that have the purpose of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of age." 44 The state resisted not only the student intervenors' claims but also their theory of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. 45 Citing a 1972 Ohio district court case, the defendants insisted "that the Twenty-Sixth Amendment 'simply bans age qualifications above 18. '" 46 Nothing in the new election law, they argued, could reasonably be construed as denying eighteen-year-old citizens the right to vote. Reviewing the plaintiffs' evidence, however, Judge Schroeder decided that the North Carolina legislature had offered "at least plausible" and "non-tenuous" reasons for changing voting and registration procedures.
52
He concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to show evidence of discriminatory intent against young people, and he dismissed their Twenty-Sixth Amendment claim.
53
The plaintiffs appealed and on July 29, 2016, the Fourth Circuit reversed much of the district court's decision. 54 In a strongly worded opinion, the court held that the challenged provisions were enacted with racially discriminatory intent and therefore violated both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Tennessee law requires that voters show photo identification but specifically excludes both student ID cards and out-of-state ID cards.
59
Current and retired faculty and employee ID cards from public colleges and universities in Tennessee, however, are accepted as voter identification.
60
In March 2015, the Nashville Student Organizing Committee and several student plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that Tennessee's voter ID law violated the Fourteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments.
61
The complaint did not articulate a clear Twenty-Sixth Amendment test but implied that the correct standard was intentional discrimination. 62 The plaintiffs argued that in formulating the list of acceptable forms of voter ID, the legislature had deliberately sought to suppress young voters, especially out-of-state college students. 63 They also claimed that the law ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, as it amounted to differential treatment between out-of-state and in-state students and between students and employees of Tennessee's public colleges and universities. 64 The exclusion of out-of-state IDs and student IDs from public colleges was irrational, they alleged.
65
On review for summary judgment, the district court rejected the Addressing the plaintiffs' Twenty-Sixth Amendment claim, Judge Trauger first rebuffed the state's argument that the Amendment was designed to prohibit voter discrimination against eighteen-to twenty-year-olds only, and that because student ID holders were not necessarily within this age range the plaintiffs' claim failed. Notably, the district court implied that a state law that imposed a "unique burden" on students might be prohibited by the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. 71 Judge Trauger noted that the few previous cases that had found a Twenty-Sixth Amendment violation had involved statutes that set a heightened standard for voters under age twenty-one. 72 In this case, though, the court suggested that students could use any one of the same photo ID options that were available to nonstudents; the fact that they could not also use their student IDs did not amount to an unconstitutional burden on their voting rights.
73
C. Virginia
Virginia's most recent voter ID law was enacted in 2013 by a Republican legislature on a party-line vote and restricts the types of ID that were previously acceptable for voting. 74 As in Tennessee, Virginia voters must present photo identification; however, unlike the Tennessee statute, Virginia law permits the use of student IDs from private schools, 
D. Wisconsin
Of all the voting rights cases currently winding their way through the courts, the litigation in Wisconsin has featured the most significant wrangling over the proper interpretation and application of the TwentySixth Amendment.
89
Beginning in 2011, the year after a Republican governor and Republican majorities in both state houses were elected, the Wisconsin state legislature passed a series of laws significantly modifying the state's election system.
90
These changes included a photo ID law, an increase in the durational residency requirement from ten to twenty-eight days, limitations on early voting, and assorted new restrictions on voter registration.
91
Two progressive organizations and a number of named plaintiffs-including a twenty-one-year-old college 85 . Compare id. at 610 ("In examining circumstantial evidence to discern the intent of legislative action, courts consider its historical background [and] The Wisconsin plaintiffs, who submitted their brief nearly simultaneously with the Virginia plaintiffs, made almost identical arguments about the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. They maintained that the Amendment prohibited intentional discrimination against young voters: " [L] aws that have the purpose, at least in part, of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of age are unconstitutional." 94 They charged that the Wisconsin legislature had enacted a number of the challenged provisions deliberately to suppress young voters.
95
The plaintiffs devoted particular attention to a change in the law regarding college students' voter registration: before 2011, Wisconsin college and university students were able to register by using their student IDs in conjunction with "dorm lists" that their schools compiled for municipal clerks.
96
The legislature changed the law to require that the dorm lists also indicate whether students are U.S. citizens, which is information that the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act prohibits educational institutions from disclosing. 97 As a result, most Wisconsin colleges and universities stopped providing dorm lists to clerks.
98
"The Wisconsin legislature," the plaintiffs argued, "also overtly targeted young people in making it more difficult to register to vote." 99 Moving for summary judgment, the state offered an unusually thorough rebuttal to an intentional discrimination theory of the Twenty- In the most far-reaching opinion about the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to date, Judge James Peterson wholeheartedly endorsed the argument that the Amendment prohibits intentional voter discrimination based on age and that courts should apply the Arlington Heights framework to such claims. 103 Looking at the facts before the court, however, Judge Peterson held that there was insufficient evidence that the Wisconsin legislature had purposely intended to suppress young voters. 104 The state's rationale for restricting the use of college IDs, in particular, were "not so feeble as to suggest intentional discrimination." 105 The district court went on, however, to overturn some of these same provisions on different grounds. 106 Judge Peterson held that the requirement that dorm lists include citizenship information, for example, violated both the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The judge concluded that even though the changes to the dorm list law "impose[d] only slight burdens, the state has not offered even a minimally rational justification for the law."
111
The court also invalidated Wisconsin's prohibition on using expired college or university IDs to vote as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
112
Given that the law also required voters using student identification to present proof of current enrollment, the court found, a requirement that the identification card itself be valid was redundant: " [ Examined carefully, however, the history of the voting age amendment offers little guidance for choosing between such normative arguments. Indeed, the story of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment-a story that I have told more fully elsewhere 120 -reveals that advocates and opponents of eighteen-year-old voting had a range of goals and rationales, many of which shifted over time in response to immediate political circumstances.
121
A complete retelling is beyond the scope of this Article, but the following is a condensed version.
The story of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment begins during World War II.
122
Faced with rising military needs, Congress had to decide between drafting more married men or lowering the minimum draft age from twenty-one to eighteen. The sole exception was Georgia, which lowered its minimum voting age to eighteen in 1944.
128
The well known slogan, "old enough to fight, old enough to vote," which would be a rallying cry decades later, likely dates from the campaign in 119. Thomsen I Defendants' Brief, supra note 100, at 55. 120. See Jenny Diamond Cheng, How Eighteen-Year-Olds Got the Vote 9 (Aug. 4, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2818730 (follow "Open PDF in Browser" hyperlink); Jenny Diamond Cheng, Uncovering the TwentySixth Amendment (2008) Indeed, as the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Celler would stymie advocates for decades by steadfastly refusing to hold hearings on any and all proposals for a voting age amendment. 134 The idea of lowering the voting age surfaced again in the early 1950s.
135
The Korean War prompted new complaints that it was unfair to draft soldiers who could not vote. 136 Furthermore, advocates argued that given improved education and technological advances-such as television and radio-contemporary eighteen-year-olds were simply more qualified to vote than previous generations had been.
137
Such claims, while controversial, resonated in the context of the postwar baby boom, which put children and youth at the center of a newly prosperous, buoyant society.
138
Public support for eighteen-year-old voting soared.
139
In the 1950s, though, Republicans took up the cause of eighteenyear-old voting.
140
Young voters, who had leaned strongly Democratic from the New Deal through the 1940s, began to shift toward the Republican Party in the early-to-mid 1950s.
141
In January 1954, a Republican-sponsored constitutional amendment to lower the voting age reached the Senate floor; it failed to reach the necessary two-thirds majority, with Republicans solidly in favor, but Democrats-especially Southern Democrats-skewing against the bill.
142
From the mid-1950s through the late 1960s, the minimum voting age remained a low-level but perennial issue. State legislatures regularly considered-and voted down-proposals to lower their voting ages.
143
The few constitutional amendments that passed were almost always rejected by voters.
144
Advocates of eighteen-year-old voting continued to hammer away both at the injustice of denying the franchise to draftees and the ways in which modern young people were especially knowledgeable about public affairs. 145 Furthermore, they argued that lowering the voting age would improve turnout rates and mitigate apathy.
146
The schools' good work in educating citizens, they argued, was undone by the three-year wait for voting rights after graduation. Eighteen-year-old voting began to gain real momentum in the late 1960s, with an increasing number of state and federal legislators introducing constitutional amendments to lower the voting age.
149
The intensifying war in Vietnam, of course, lent new urgency to the longstanding argument that it was unfair to draft soldiers who could not vote for the leaders sending them into battle.
150
The social unrest of the era, particularly among college students, also contributed to a new interest in lowering the voting age, although it had contradictory effects.
151
On the one hand, the campus demonstrations significantly weakened public support for eighteen-year-old voting and directly led to the defeat of a number of state proposals.
152
At the same time, the notion that reducing the voting age would stem the rising tide of student unrest by channeling youthful energies into less-frightening forms of political expression gained a surprising amount of traction, especially among federal legislators.
153
By 1968, the voting age had once again become a Democratic cause. 154 Both Republican and Democratic politicians continued to support eighteen-year-old voting, at least publicly, although Republicans began to openly disagree with the idea of lowering the voting age through federal constitutional amendment. However, by this point, the conventional wisdom was that young voters would likely skew Democratic, and both Republican and Democratic politicians frequently assumed that lowering the voting would disproportionately benefit the Democratic party. 155 Politicians from both parties, though, were clearly awed by Senator Eugene McCarthy's 1968 presidential campaign, which galvanized squads of enthusiastic young volunteers. 156 Some could barely contain their hopes that they, too, might be able to inspire the same sort of dedication, especially if young people were given the vote. This was, essentially, an end run around Congressman Celler, who was implacably opposed to eighteen-year-old voting but also strongly supported the Voting Rights Act.
159
In making their case, the two senators and their allies echoed many familiar rationales for a lower voting age, pointing to the injustice of denying soldiers the vote, modern improvements in education, and the hope that the vote could act as a sort of safety valve for young people's discontent. 160 However, they also stressed the idea that denying the vote to eighteen-, nineteen-, and twenty-year-olds was both legally and politically analogous to voting discrimination against African-Americans and other minority groups. 161 Advocates framed eighteen-year-old voting as the inevitable next step in a bigger movement toward a broader and
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162
For a variety of reasons, the Mansfield-Kennedy proposal was the right idea at the right time. Despite angry objections from conservative Southern legislators who viewed the eighteen-year-old voting provision as yet another nail in the coffin of state sovereignty, the Voting Rights Extension Act passed both houses and was grudgingly signed by President Nixon. 163 With the 1972 elections looming, the Supreme Court quickly decided a set of cases challenging the constitutionality of the eighteenyear-old voting provision, among other parts of the Voting Rights Act. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 164 the Court upheld the eighteen-year-old voting statute with respect to federal elections, but struck it down as it applied to state and local elections. 165 For the forty-seven states that had minimum voting ages over eighteen, the Supreme Court's holding presented a massive administrative problem. State election officials reported that the costs of administering a dual-age voting system-with one age limit for elections of federal officials and another for elections of state and local officialswould be staggering. 166 Many worried that the logistical complications would create serious delay and increase the possibility of election fraud. 167 In response, both houses of Congress quickly passed a constitutional amendment lowering the voting age to eighteen in both state and federal election.
168
Within an hour, both the Delaware and Minnesota legislatures ratified the new amendment and other states followed swiftly. As this historical recitation demonstrates, questions about how to interpret the Twenty-Sixth Amendment cannot be resolved by looking to original intent. The lawmakers who drafted and ratified the voting age amendment were animated by a range of motives and rationales, ranging from naked partisan preferences to genuine belief about the contours of citizenship, the capacities of young people, and the meaning of the franchise.
172
The power of these different arguments and counterarguments waxed and waned over the course of three decades, as both advocates and opponents responded to immediate events and trends. 173 Many times logic seemed to have little to do with the balance of persuasive power, and arguments that seem unconvincing to many contemporary readers were nonetheless powerful at the time. 174 Along similar lines, the eighteen-year-old voting issue was always bound up with immediate electoral concerns. 175 Partisan alignments shifted as election results and public opinion polls suggested that youthful voters might swing one way, or another. Despite repeated suggestions by close observers that lowering the voting age was unlikely to have meaningful political consequences, both Democratic and Republican politicians consistently viewed eighteen-year-old voting through the lens of electoral politics.
177
Searching for a dominant "original intent" behind the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, then, is a quixotic task. 178 It is true that, as both the North Carolina and Wisconsin plaintiffs argued, many of the framers of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment intended the amendment to broadly redress unfair discrimination against young voters, as well as to meaningfully encourage disaffected young people to participate in electoral politics.
179
It is also correct-as the state of Wisconsin suggested in its brief-that plenty of the lawmakers who ratified the Twenty-sixth Amendment simply intended to lower the age qualification for voting to eighteen, nothing more.
180
For judges faced with choosing between such competing interpretations, the actual historical record is of limited use. III. AN INTRATEXTUALIST APPROACH Intratextualism, on the other hand, offers a much sturdier footing for interpreting the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. On this theory of constitutional interpretation, clauses in the Constitution that share similar words or phrases should be read in a similar way.
181
As constitutional scholar and intratextualist Akhil Amar has said, "What's sauce for one [constitutional command] must be sauce for the other."
182
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment is well suited to an intratextual reading because it shares nearly identical wording with the Fifteenth Amendment-as well as with the Nineteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments. 183 Indeed, the language is so close that reading the amendments together seems to be the most obvious approach. 184 One of the great virtues of an intratextualist approach to the TwentySixth Amendment is that it does not tempt us to oversimplify the historical record in a search for original intent. Indeed, intratextualists argue compellingly that similar constitutional texts should be read similarly regardless of whether the drafters consciously intended the parallels.
185
This is especially helpful when considering the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which was drafted by anonymous staffers and the precise text of which was virtually never discussed in three decades of debate. 185. Amar, supra note 181, at 789. 186. The exact wording of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment is identical to the core text of a proposal first made in 1942. See How Eighteen-Year-Olds Got the Vote, supra note 120, at 7. In a brief interchange in a 1943 House subcommittee hearing, one member reported that the proposal had been drafted by the legislature service and another implied that it had been
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifteenth Amendment as prohibiting election laws or practices that are motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose.
187
This is generally regarded as a relatively narrow construction, 188 but the Court has also noted that the Fifteenth Amendment "nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination." 189 The Twenty-Sixth Amendment, then, invalidates laws that are intended, at least in part, to suppress any particular age group of voters.
Arlington Heights, as many have argued and the Wisconsin district court agreed, offers the most sensible framework for evaluating these sorts of claims. 190 Arlington Heights itself involved a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a denial of rezoning. 191 In assessing whether the local authorities had been motivated by racial discrimination, the Court directed lower courts to perform "a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." 192 In extreme cases, the Court noted, disparate impact may be enough to prove intentional discrimination. 193 Generally, however, courts will have to investigate more closely, and the Court set out a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered, including legislative and administrative history, possible departures from usual procedures, and statements by lawmakers.
against the young-is less deeply pernicious than race or sex discrimination. Evaluating analogies between age and race, the late political theorist Judith Shklar noted acerbically, "Being young is, of course, not a permanent physical or social condition, and in a society that worships youth it is anything but degrading." 197 In response, while intentional discrimination against young voters might seem somewhat less morally problematic-for both historical and social reasons-than discrimination against African-American voters, it is profoundly anti-democratic. As political scientists have shown, voting is a habit. 198 Deliberately making it more difficult for new voters to build that habit of political participation quite literally threatens the future of participatory democracy.
Furthermore, in recent years age and race have become strikingly more intertwined. The population of young Americans is dramatically more diverse than are older age groups; one 2015 study found that while three-quarters of Americans age fifty-five or older identify as white, only about fifty-six percent of those age eighteen to thirty-four do. 199 Indeed, there is good reason to think that much of the generation gap in the 2016 election was due to race, rather than simply age; Trump won white voters age eighteen to twenty-nine by five points, but there were far fewer white voters in that age group. 200 Are efforts to suppress young voters because they are likely to vote Democratic better characterized as discrimination based on age, or on race? Given rapidly shifting demographics, the difference between the two may be eroding.
From a different perspective, some may worry that interpreting the Twenty-Sixth Amendment like the Fifteenth Amendment will effectively defang claims of age-based voter discrimination, given courts' notorious reluctance to impute discriminatory intent to state legislatures. 201 In an amicus brief to the Seventh Circuit, the nonprofit group Common Cause applauded the district court's finding that the challenged provisions violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment but criticized the court for sidestepping the Twenty-Sixth Amendment 202 : "By failing to consider the legislature's aim-to keep young people from the ballot box-the district court rendered the Twenty-Sixth Amendment obsolete." 203 This is a valid concern. If courts read the Twenty-Sixth Amendment as prohibiting intentional discrimination but then impose an impossibly high standard for finding evidence of such discrimination, then the interpretation will be meaningless. Scholars and advocates would also do well to look closely at how the rules of evidence are being deployed in voting rights cases. In North Carolina, the defendants successfully managed to both exclude a newspaper article quoting a state legislator saying "college students don't pay squat taxes" and quash a subpoena to question that same legislator. 204 Despite these reservations, an Arlington Heights approach to the Twenty-Sixth Amendment remains the most workable, theoretically sound approach for courts addressing claims of unconstitutional discrimination against young voters.
CONCLUSION
Fierce partisan battles over the nation's voting apparatus are not going to end any time soon. Despite winning the Electoral College vote and thus the presidency, Donald Trump has repeatedly claimed-without any evidence-that millions of Americans illegally cast votes for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election. The new U.S. Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, has clearly signaled that under his leadership the Department of Justice will be far less interested in challenging state voter restrictions. 205 A number of states are considering new restrictive legislation, while other states are moving in the opposite direction by expanding absentee voting, early voting, and online registration. 206 gap in political preferences. For the immediate future, at least, Democrats probably will try to maximize youth voting while Republicans will seek to minimize it. We can therefore expect to see more litigation over the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in the coming years.
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment was, in many ways, a product of the baby boom. As I have argued elsewhere, it is no coincidence that the eighteen-year-old voting movement really took off in the late 1960s, just when the first baby boomers turned twenty-one. 208 Many of today's millennials are, of course, the baby boomers' children. There is a certain narrative satisfaction in these young voters using their parents' Amendment to push back against efforts to abridge their voting rights.
